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Abstract
This paper provides a thorough analysis of oligopolistic markets with positive demand-side
network externalities and perfect compatibility. The minimal structure imposed on the model
primitives is such that industry output increases in a ￿rm￿ s rivals￿total output as well as in the
expected network size. This leads to a generalized equilibrium existence treatment that includes
guarantees for a nontrivial equilibrium, and some insight into possible multiplicity of equilibria.
We formalize the concept of industry viability and show that it is always enhanced by having
more ￿rms in the market. We also characterize the e⁄ects of market structure on industry
performance, with an emphasis on departures from standard markets. As per-￿rm pro￿ts need
not be monotonic in the number of competitors, we revisit the concept of free entry equilibrium
for network industries. The approach relies on lattice-theoretic methods, which allow for a uni￿ed
treatment of various general results in the literature on network goods. Several illustrative
examples with closed-form solutions are also provided.
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11 Introduction
It has often been observed that the nature of competition is qualitatively di⁄erent in network
industries. The presence of interdependencies in consumers￿purchasing decisions induces demand-
side economies of scale that highly a⁄ect market behavior and performance. When such e⁄ects
prevail, be they of the snob or bandwagon type, purchase decisions are strongly in￿ uenced by
buyers￿expectations, leading to behavior not encompassed by traditional demand theory (Veblen,
1899 and Leibenstein, 1950).
From an industrial organization perspective, these distinctive features raise new questions and
impose some challenges from a methodological perspective. In their pioneering work on markets with
network e⁄ects, Katz and Shapiro (1985) developed the concept of ful￿lled expectations Cournot
equilibrium, which was widely adopted. The resulting literature on the topic has established a
number of results that distinguish network markets from ordinary markets.1
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a thorough theoretical investigation of markets
with homogeneous goods and network externalities, which uni￿es and extends the existing studies
and tackles a number of new issues of interest that were either not previously addressed or only
partially studied. We consider oligopolistic competition amongst ￿rms in a market characterized
by positive (direct) network e⁄ects when the products of the ￿rms are perfectly compatible with
each other, so the relevant network is industry-wide. While the current literature is more concerned
with the case of ￿rm-speci￿c networks, three arguments justify our choice. First, several important
industries ￿t the perfect compatibility framework, in particular those in the telecommunications
sector, such as fax machines and phones, but also many classical industries such as fashion, auto-
mobiles, entertainment, etc...2 Second, there are still several outstanding issues, which, although
addressed in the growing literature on network externalities, have not been fully articulated from
a modeling perspective, and thus remain less than fully understood from a theoretical standpoint.
Third, a good understanding of the single network case can shed quite some light on the incentives
for compatibility faced by ￿rms in the case of ￿rm-speci￿c networks.
In its unifying scope, with an emphasis on minimal and economically meaningful assumptions
on the market primitives, the paper provides a general existence result for non-trivial equilibria (i.e.
1See Economides and Himmelberg (1995), Economides (1996), Shy (2001), and Kwon (2007), among others.
2For some of these industries, each customer may have in mind his own social network only, as opposed to the overall
industry network, when making a purchase decision, but we follow much of the literature in industrial organization
in ignoring this distinction.
2those with positive production), a uniqueness argument, and an extensive inquiry into the e⁄ects
of market structure (or exogenous entry) on market performance. In terms of novel questions, the
paper o⁄ers a general treatment of the critical issue of industry start-up, including the role of the
number of ￿rms in the market; some insight into the notion that the presence of expectations can
substantially broaden the scope of possible outcomes relative to standard Cournot oligopoly; and
a new look at the notion of free entry equilibrium into network industries. Throughout, the paper
takes a comparative perspective in that new ￿ndings are contrasted with their standard Cournot
counterparts, in an attempt to shed light on the novel features of network industries.
The underlying approach is to impart minimal monotonicity structure to the oligopoly model
at hand, which achieves the twin goals of ensuring the existence of a ful￿lled expectations Cournot
equilibrium while at the same time allowing clear-cut predictions on the comparative statics of
market performance with respect to the number of ￿rms. The critical structure is imposed on the
model in the form of two economically meaningful complementarity conditions on the primitives
that guarantee the key properties that, along a given ￿rm￿ s best response, industry output increases
in rivals￿total output as well as in the expected network size. The overall analysis relies on lattice-
theoretic methods.3 This approach allows us to unify in a common setting the existing results in the
literature on network goods, considerably weakening the required conditions, as well as to derive
important new results. A key bene￿t of the approach is to allow for more transparent economic
intuition behind the cause-e⁄ect relationships we analyze.
We next provide a more detailed overview of our ￿ndings, coupled with a literature review. The
problem of existence of ful￿lled expectations Cournot equilibrium proceeds in two distinct steps.
To establish abstract existence via Tarski￿ s ￿xed point theorem, we adopt the arguments of Amir
and Lambson (2000) and Kwon (2007) that directly exploit the monotonicity structure discussed
above. However, as expectations about the size of the network is a key determinant of consumers￿
willingness to pay in these industries, the trivial, no production, equilibrium is often part of the
equilibrium set. When this is the case, our previous proof of existence is not of much interest; it
uses powerful methods to establish existence, but the underlying equilibrium may a priori be the
trivial one, the presence of which can be characterized in more direct fashion. As a consequence we
complete the analysis by o⁄ering a second set of (stronger) conditions that ensure the existence of
(at least) one non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive sales.
Although our model is static in nature, we construct an explicit dynamics mapping consumers￿
3See Topkis (1978), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
3expectation of the network size to the corresponding Cournot industry output to analyze the via-
bility of the industry. This tatonnement-type dynamics is quite natural and has tacitly been the
basis of many discussions of the viability issue in the literature. Some studies that consider telecom-
munications markets, such as Rohlfs (1974) and Economides and Himmelberg (1995), suggest that
network industries typically have three equilibria. Under this natural dynamics, the two extreme
equilibria are stable in expectations and the middle equilibrium (usually called critical mass) is
unstable. The argument behind this structure is quite simple for pure network goods: If consumers
expect that few buyers will acquire the good, then the good will be of little value to consumers
and few will end up buying it. These low sales in turn further depress consumers￿expectations
through the above dynamics, and the market unravels towards the trivial (or no-trade) equilibrium.
However, if expectations are higher to start with, other, non-trivial, equilibria will also be possible.
This argument is often used to explain the start-up problem in network industries, or the di¢ cul-
ties faced by the incumbent ￿rms in attempting to generate enough expectations to achieve critical
mass.
An important aim of the present paper is to shed light on the role of market structure as a
determinant of the viability of a network industry, a novel issue that, somewhat surprisingly, has
not yet been addressed in the literature. We ￿nd that the presence of more ￿rms in the market
always enhances industry viability.
Regarding market performance, the extremal equilibria (i.e. maximal and minimal) lead to an
industry output that increases in the number of ￿rms, n, as in standard Cournot competition. On
the other hand, as this also implies an increase in the equilibrium network size or expectations,
the output result does not imply that market price decreases in n. Thus, the so-called property
of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar assumptions holds in standard Cournot competition,
does not hold here.4 In addition, when n increases per-￿rm equilibrium output increases if the
demand is not too log-concave and decreases otherwise.
The most drastic departure from standard oligopoly lies in the e⁄ects of entry on per-￿rm pro￿ts.
Whenever per-￿rm outputs and the market price increase (decrease) with n; per-￿rm pro￿ts increase
(decrease) in n as well.5 The conclusion that competition may increase each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is quite
provocative and leads to several important implications, both from theoretical and policy-oriented
4A Cournot market is said to be quasi-competitive if the equilibrium market price decreases with the number of
￿rms in the industry.
5This result already appears in the context of a model with an inverse demand function that is linear in output
and no costs of production in Economides (1996), who in turn formalizes a remark made by Katz and Shapiro (1985).
4perspectives. We explore in some detail the consequences on the concept of free entry. We show
that free entry is quite indeterminate in industries with network externalities, and propose the
concept of strong free entry equilibrium as a re￿nement that leads to the free entry equilibrium
with the largest number of ￿rms as unique outcome. However, this re￿nement requires some pre-
play communication amongst ￿rms without the possibility of making binding agreements. Such
coordination, though pro-competitive in that it increases competition, may well engender antitrust
action. In addition, since the incumbent ￿rms in the market may prefer to see further entry by new
￿rms, a number of policy issues may need a fresh look and some revisiting. There may be more scope
for pro-competitive cooperation or coordination by ￿rms. One might observe a higher propensity for
licensing, possibly coupled with lower royalty rates; less patenting or a permissive attitude towards
patent infringement; as well as more product standardization in industries where each ￿rm might
possess its own separate network of consumers. These likely policy consequences are similar to
those one might expect to see as a consequence of the result that having more ￿rms alleviates the
start-up problem for the industry. In short, when more competition can be necessary to get the
industry started up, or to enhance each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in an ongoing industry, the usual trade-o⁄s
between consumer surplus and producer surplus are no longer the norm, and it is not surprising
that many pillars of conventional wisdom about market behavior and appropriate antitrust policy
might need revisiting. In particular, new avenues for cooperation amongst ￿rms that compete in
the product market might open up in network industries. Proper reaction to these new incentives
for coordinated action by market competitors might well require a substantial overhaul of existing
antitrust policy (Shapiro, 1996). This in turn ought to rely on extensive theoretical analysis focusing
on the special nature of industries with network externalities, and this is a primary motivation of
the present work.
The e⁄ects of entry on industry performance as re￿ ected in social welfare, consumer surplus and
industry pro￿ts also display some distinctive features as compared to standard Cournot competition.
The demand-side economies of scale weaken the conditions under which social welfare and industry
pro￿ts increase with more entry. Alternatively, if the cross-e⁄ect on the inverse demand function is
positive, it is possible that consumer surplus decreases with n: Katz and Shapiro (1985) explain, in a
similar (although not identical) situation, the intuition behind this result: If the network externality
is strong for the marginal consumer, then the increase in the expected network caused by the change
in the number of ￿rms will raise his or her willingness to pay for the good by more than that of the
average consumer. As a consequence, the ￿rms will be able to raise price by more than the increase
5in the average consumer￿ s willingness to pay for the product and consumer surplus will fall.
Another noteworthy aspect of this paper is that we provide several explicit examples with easy
closed-form solutions to illustrate in a simple way some of the conclusions we derive. In particular,
Example 1 captures most of the relevant features often associated with the telecommunication
industry in the literature.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, introduces the equilibrium
concept and the main assumptions. Section 3 proves existence of trivial and non-trivial equilibria,
and provides conditions for the equilibrium to be unique. Section 4 discusses the scope for network
e⁄ects to broaden the set of possible outcomes. Section 5 studies industry viability. Section 6
analyzes output, price and per-￿rm pro￿ts as a function of the number of ￿rms in the market.
Section 7 deals with free entry equilibrium in markets with network e⁄ects. Section 8 looks at
market performance as re￿ ected in social welfare, consumer surplus and aggregate pro￿ts, again,
as a function of n. Section 9 contains all the proofs of this paper. Finally, an elementary and
self-contained review of the lattice-theoretic notions and results needed here forms the Appendix.
2 The analytical framework
This section presents the standard oligopoly model with network e⁄ects along with the commonly
used equilibrium concept due to Katz and Shapiro (1985). In view of the more general nature of
our treatment, we enumerate all the needed assumptions we shall use later and their justi￿cation.
We consider a static model to analyze oligopolistic competition in industries with positive net-
work e⁄ects, re￿ ected in consumers￿willingness to pay being increasing in the number of other
agents acquiring the same good. We assume the ￿rms￿products are homogeneous and perfectly
compatible with each other, so there is a single network comprising the outputs of all ￿rms in the
industry.
The market is fully described by the inverse demand function P (Z;S) and the number of
identical ￿rms n, each having cost function C (x), where x denotes the ￿rm￿ s output, Z aggregate
output in the market and S the expected size of the network. The cost of producing no output
is zero: Considering that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good, S also stands for the
expected number of people buying the good. Sometimes, it will be useful to express the production
6Some of the examples we construct below do not satisfy all the assumptions in this paper. As the violations are
not critical in any way and analytical examples (with nice closed-form solutions that capture the features we want to
highlight) are hard to come by, we are not concerned by this issue.
6side in terms of average cost A(x); de￿ned as C (x)=x with A(0) = C0(0):
For a given S; each ￿rm￿ s reaction correspondence is obtained by maximizing the pro￿t function
￿ (x;y;S) = xP (x + y;S) ￿ C (x)
e x(y;S) = argmaxf￿ (x;y;S) : 0 ￿ x ￿ Kg (1)
where x is the ￿rm￿ s level of output, y the output of the other (n ￿ 1) ￿rms in the market and
K > 0 the production capacity of each ￿rm.
At equilibrium, all relevant quantities x;y;Z and ￿ will be indexed by the underlying number
of ￿rms n, e.g., we shall denote Zn the equilibrium industry output corresponding to n ￿rms in the
market, and xin the equilibrium output of ￿rm i. When clear from the context, we will avoid the
subindex i in the latter variable.
Each ￿rm chooses its output level to maximize its pro￿ts under the assumptions that (i) con-
sumers￿expectations about the size of the network, S; is given; and (ii) the output level of the other
￿rms, y, is ￿xed. Alternatively, we may think of the ￿rm as choosing total output Z = x+y, given
the other ￿rm￿ s cumulative output, y; and the expected size of the network, S, in which case, with
e ￿ (Z;y;S) = (Z ￿ y)P (Z;S) ￿ C (Z ￿ y)
e Z (y;S) = argmaxfe ￿ (Z;y;S) : y ￿ Z ￿ y + Kg: (2)
Consistency requires e Z (y;S) = e x(y;S) + y:
An equilibrium in this game is a vector (x1n;x2n;:::;xnn) that satis￿es the following conditions
1. xin 2 argmax
n
xP
￿
x +
P
j6=i xjn;S
￿
￿ C (x) : 0 ￿ x ￿ K
o
; and
2. S =
P
i xin.
Since the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985), this notion of equilibrium, known as
"Ful￿lled Expectations Cournot Equilibrium (FECE)", has become standard for oligopolies with
network e⁄ects. It requires that both consumers and ￿rms correctly predict the market outcome,
so that their beliefs are con￿rmed in equilibrium, i.e., expectations are rational. While strategic in
their choice of outputs in the usual Cournot sense, ￿rms are "network-size taking" in their perceived
inability to directly in￿ uence customers￿expectations of market size. One plausible justi￿cation for
this is that ￿rms are unable to credibly commit to output levels that customers could observe and
reliably use in formulating expectations about network size (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).7
7Were such commitment credible for ￿rms, standard Cournot equilibrium with inverse demand function P (Z;Z)
7Viewing S as an inverse demand shift variable, condition 1 just describes the equilibrium in
standard Cournot competition with exogenous S. Let zn (S) denote the corresponding industry
output equilibrium correspondence. Adding condition 2, an aggregate output Zn 2 zn (S) consti-
tutes a FECE industry output if it satis￿es Zn = S as well. As a consequence, if we graph zn (S)
as a function of S, the FECE industry outputs are all the points where this correspondence crosses
the 45￿ line. This idea will play a key role in both the proof of existence and the viability analysis.
Another, fully game-theoretic, interpretation of this equilibrium notion is in the context of a
two-stage game, wherein a market maker (or a regulator) announces an expected network size S
in the ￿rst stage, and ￿rms compete in Cournot fashion facing inverse demand P(Z;S) in the
second stage. If the market maker￿ s objective function is to minimize jS ￿ zn (S)j, then to any
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game corresponds a FECE of the Cournot market with network
externalities, and vice-versa.
Whenever well-de￿ned, we denote the maximal and minimal points of a set by an upper and
a lower bar, respectively. Thus, for instance, Zn and Zn are the highest and lowest industry
equilibrium outputs when there are n ￿rms in the market.
Denote by W (Z;S) ,
R Z
0 P (t;S)dt ￿ ZA(Z=n) the Marshallian social welfare when aggregate
output is Z; all ￿rms produce the same quantity and the expected size of the network is S. Similarly,
consumer surplus is CS (Z;S) ,
R Z
0 P (t;S)dt ￿ ZP (Z;S).
We now list the assumptions used in this paper, starting with a set of standard ones, followed
by more substantive assumptions.
The standard assumptions are
(A1) P (:;:) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, P1 (Z;S) < 0 and P2 (Z;S) > 0.
(A2) C (:) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and increasing.
(A3) xi ￿ K; for all ￿rm i.
These are all commonly used assumptions, including P2 (Z;S) > 0, which re￿ ects positive net-
work e⁄ects, or the property that consumers￿willingness to pay increases in the expected number
of people who will buy the good. Assumption A3 imposes capacity constraints in the production
process of each ￿rm, a convenient assumption to force compact output sets in a setting where ￿rms
would be the more appropriate concept. A direct comparison between these two concepts also appears in Katz and
Shapiro (1985).
8may otherwise wish to produce unbounded output levels. Our results do not rely in any way on K
taking on any particular sets of values, as in Amir and Lambson (2000).
The second set of assumptions are placed on two functions that play a key role in the overall
analysis. Let ￿1 (Z;y) denote the cross-partial derivative of e ￿ (Z;y;S) with respect to Z and y, and
￿2 (Z;S) the cross-partial derivative of logP (Z;S) with respect to Z and S, scaled by [P (Z;S)]
2 ;
￿1 (Z;y) = ￿P1 (Z;S) + C00 (Z ￿ y) and
￿2 (Z;S) = P (Z;S)P12 (Z;S) ￿ P1 (Z;S)P2 (Z;S)
The domains of ￿1 and ￿2 are ’1 ￿ f(Z;y) : y ￿ 0;Z ￿ yg and ’2 ￿ f(Z;S) : Z ￿ y;S ￿ 0g
respectively, both of which are lattices (in the product order).
The second set of assumptions is
(A4) ￿1 (Z;y) = ￿P1 (Z;S) + C00 (Z ￿ y) > 0 on ’1.
(A5) ￿2 (Z;S) = P (Z;S)P12 (Z;S) ￿ P1 (Z;S)P2 (Z;S) > 0 on ’2.
(A6) P (Z;S)P11 (Z;S) ￿ [P1 (Z;S)]
2 < 0 on ’2:
Assumptions A4 and A5 guarantee that the pro￿t function e ￿ (Z;y;S) has strictly increasing
di⁄erences on ’1 and the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S); respectively. A4 allows for limited
scale economies in production, and has been justi￿ed in detail by Amir and Lambson (2000). A5 has
the precise economic interpretation that the elasticity of demand increases in the expected network
size S:8 In his pioneering study of the elementary microeconomic foundations of interdependent
demands, Leibenstein (1950) suggested that demand is more elastic in network markets because
individual reactions to price changes are followed by additional reactions, in the same direction, to
each other￿ s change in consumption.9 A5 essentially captures the cumulative e⁄ect of these mutually
reinforcing e⁄ects on aggregate demand. Another plausible interpretation of A5 is that it formalizes
the concept of demand-side scale economies that is often postulated as a characteristic of network
e⁄ects in the literature, though not in a precise manner. In terms of the model structure, the direct
e⁄ects of A4 and A5 in the upcoming analysis are that e Z (y;S) increases in y and S, respectively.
8The price elasticity of demand is ￿
￿
@P(Z;S)
@Z
Z
P(Z;S)
￿￿1
= ￿
￿
Z
@ log P(Z;S)
@Z
￿￿1
; which is increasing in S if and
only if logP (Z;S) has increasing di⁄erences in (Z;S) (Topkis, 1998, p. 66).
9Although Leibenstein referred to the concept of positively interdependent demands as "bandwagon e⁄ect", it is
essentially identical to the network e⁄ect we analyze in this paper.
9A6 holds that P (Z;S) is log-concave in Z. This is a generalized concavity condition that
guarantees that e Z (y;S) is a single-valued function. As most results in this paper do not require
the latter property, A6 is crucially needed only for the uniqueness result, Theorem 7.
3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
In this section we provide a general abstract equilibrium existence result, exploiting the minimal
monotonic structure of the model re￿ ected in A4-A5. Then we derive additional su¢ cient conditions
that guarantee the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive industry
output. We ￿nally provide conditions for the equilibrium to be unique.
3.1 Existence of FECE
We begin with the central monotonicity result, which is a direct consequence of A4 and A5.
Lemma 1 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed. Then, every selection of the best-response correspondence
e Z (y;S) is increasing in both y and S.
This lemma leads to an abstract existence result for symmetric equilibrium, along with the fact
that the same assumptions preclude the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed. Then, for each n 2 N; the Cournot oligopoly with network
e⁄ects has (at least) one symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 extends the existence results in the literature of network goods to a very general
setting, dispensing with both the assumptions of no cross-e⁄ects on the demand side and constant
marginal costs of production that are commonly found in the literature (Katz and Shapiro, 1985,
Economides and Himmelberg, 1995, and Economides, 1996, among others).
Comparing the assumptions we impose here with those in standard Cournot competition, the
only new requirement is that the price elasticity of demand increases with the network size (A5),
taking P2 (Z;S) > 0 as a natural property of network markets. Analogs of all other assumptions
are also needed for proving existence in the standard Cournot model, as re￿ ected in Theorem 2.1,
Amir and Lambson (2000), as seen next.
Lemma 3 Assume A1-A4 are satis￿ed. Then, for any given n 2 N,
10(i) the standard Cournot oligopoly (with exogenous S) has a symmetric equilibrium and no asym-
metric equilibria;
(ii) if in addition A5 holds, the maximal and minimal selections of zn (S), zn (S) and zn (S),
increase in S; and
(iii) if in addition A5-A6 hold, zn (:) is a single-valued and continuous function.
In network markets, the trivial (zero-production) outcome, (Z;S) = (0;0), is often an equi-
librium. This phenomenon intensi￿es when the network good has little stand-alone value (i.e.,
P(Z;0) is small). The telecommunication industries, such as faxes, phones and e-mails, typically
exhibit this characteristic. Given any of these goods, if end users believe no one else will acquire it,
the good will have no value, and the trivial outcome will necessarily be part of the equilibrium set.
In such markets, Theorem 2 is not of much interest since the underlying equilibrium may a priori
be the trivial one, the presence of which can be characterized in more direct fashion. To complete
the picture, we ￿rst provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the trivial equilibrium, and then
add some extra assumptions to ensure the existence of (at least) one non-trivial equilibrium.
Lemma 4 For any n 2 N, the trivial outcome is an equilibrium if and only if
xP (x;0) ￿ C (x) for all x 2 [0;K]: (3)
Thus if the trivial outcome is an equilibrium for some n, it remains an equilibrium for all n 2 N.
This lemma simply says that the trivial equilibrium arises if and only if when the common
expectation (amongst ￿rms and consumers) about the size of the network is zero, and a ￿rm believes
the other ￿rms will produce no output, the best it can do under (3) is to produce zero as well. The
proof follows directly from the de￿nition of FECE. It also states that if the trivial equilibrium
prevails for a given n, the industry will admit the trivial equilibrium for any other number of ￿rms.
Building on Theorem 2, the next result provides alternative su¢ cient conditions to ensure the
existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive industry output.
Theorem 5 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed. There exists a non-trivial equilibrium if at least one of
the following conditions is also ful￿lled
(i) zero is not an equilibrium output (i.e. (3) does not hold);
11(ii) zero is an equilibrium output, P (0;0) = C0(0), P1 (0;0) + P2 (0;0) > 0 and
n > [￿P1 (0;0) + C00 (0)]=[P1 (0;0) + P2 (0;0)]; or
(iii) zero is an equilibrium output, C00 (:) ￿ 0 and for some S 2 (0;nK], some b Z ￿ S and all
Z ￿ S,
(n ￿ 1)
Z b Z
Z
P (t;S)dt +
h
b ZP
￿
b Z;S
￿
￿ ZP (Z;S)
i
￿ n2
h
C
￿
b Z=n
￿
￿ C (Z=n)
i
￿ 0: (4)
In Theorem 5 (i), a non-trivial equilibrium exists as a consequence of Theorem 2, as it guarantees
the existence of at least one equilibrium. Then, if the trivial one is not part of the equilibrium set,
there must be an equilibrium with a strict positive industry output. This result captures the case
most often investigated in the literature, dealing with a high stand-alone value for the network
good.10
Under the conditions in Part (ii), although zn (0) = 0, zn (S) starts above the 45￿ line near 0,
implying the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium in view of Theorem 2. Formally, this follows from
applying Tarski￿ s Theorem to zn (S) for S 2 [￿;nK], given some ￿ > 0 small enough. As expected,
the stronger the network e⁄ect around the origin is, as captured by P2 (0;0); the less stringent the
existence condition for the non-trivial equilibrium gets (i.e. the lower the threshold value of n is).
Condition (4) ensures that, although zn (0) = 0, zn (S) is above the 45￿ line at some S 2 (0;nK],
so a non-trivial equilibrium exists by Tarski￿ s Theorem applied to zn (:) mapping [S;nK] to itself.
An interpretation of (4), involving the evaluation of a weighted combination of welfare and pro￿ts
(see Bergstrom and Varian, 1985), is given in the Appendix (see Lemma 25).
The proof of Theorem 5 uses the following intermediate result, which also plays a key role in
the viability analysis (Section 4).
Lemma 6 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed. If 0 2 zn (0), then zn (0) = 0; i.e. zn (0) is single-valued.
If in addition P (0;0) = C0(0), the slope of zn (:) is also single-valued and right-continuous at 0, and
z0
n (0) =
nP2(0;0)
￿(n + 1)P1(0;0) + C00 (0)
: (5)
If the trivial equilibrium is not interior, i.e. P (0;0) < C0(0), then z0
n (0) = 0:
10Such goods include high-tech products such as computer systems, software and various home electronic appliances,
but also some classical goods and services such as movies, restaurants, night clubs, fashion goods, etc...
12This lemma shows the trivial equilibrium has interesting properties. Although zn (:) might a
priori be multi-valued, i.e. a correspondence, when zero is part of the equilibrium set, it is single-
valued at the origin. If in addition the trivial equilibrium is interior, the slope of this function is
given by (5) and depends on n.
3.2 Uniqueness of FECE
Theorems 2 and 5 prove existence, but they do not eliminate the possibility of multiple equilib-
ria, which, in markets with network e⁄ects, constitutes more of a norm than an exception. Multiple
equilibria are due to the positive feedback typical of network industries that derives from expecta-
tions. If consumers believe the good will not succeed, it will usually fail. On the contrary, if they
expect it to succeed, it will usually succeed.
In this subsection, we assume A6 is satis￿ed, in addition to A1-A5. The added bene￿t of A6 is
to ensure that zn (:) is single-valued and continuous, as shown in Lemma 3 (iii). Although A6 is
su¢ cient for uniqueness in standard Cournot competition (see Amir and Lambson, 2000), the same
result here requires an additional condition related to the function
f (Z;n) ,
nf[P(Z;Z) ￿ C0(Z=n)]P12(Z;Z) ￿ P1(Z;Z)P2(Z;Z)g
(n + 1)[P1(Z;Z)]
2 ￿ n[P(Z;Z) ￿ C0(Z=n)]P11(Z;Z) ￿ P1(Z;Z)C00(Z=n)
: (6)
The function f (Z;n) describes the slope of zn (S) with respect to S along the diagonal path, i.e.,
at S = Z (see Proofs): The next theorem shows uniqueness of FECE.
Theorem 7 In addition to A1-A6, assume f (Z;n) < 1 for all Z in [0;nK]: Then, the Cournot
game with network e⁄ects has a unique and symmetric FECE, which coincides with the trivial
equilibrium if and only if (3) holds.
The proof of this theorem is simple. Assuming A1-A6 are satis￿ed, zn (:) is single-valued and
continuous. If in addition f (Z;n) is everywhere lower than one, then the slope of zn (:) along the
diagonal is lower than one as well. The uniqueness result now follows directly from this observation,
since any two adjacent ￿xed points of zn (:) must include one for which f (Z;n) is larger than one.
The assumption in Theorem 7 is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition to ensure uniqueness,
in the tradition of methods based on degree theory (Dierker, 1972). Although it is not globally
satis￿ed in the less general model of Katz and Shapiro (1985), their equilibrium is unique anyway.
134 On the theoretical scope of network e⁄ects
In view of the need for an expectations-based equilibrium concept instead of one of the standard
concepts of oligopolistic behavior centered on Nash equilibrium, it is natural to investigate the
extent to which the presence of these expectations enlarges the scope of possible outcomes in network
industries. One meaningful way to frame such a question is to characterize the class of functions that
could emerge as possible equilibrium industry outputs given network size S, i.e., as possible selections
of the Cournot equilibrium correspondence zn (S).11 Some simple insights into this question can
be derived by considering, with a given number of ￿rms n, zero production costs and the speci￿c
inverse demand (see Amir and Lambson, 2000), with h0 ￿ 0;
P(Z;S) = exp[￿nZ=h(S)]: (7)
For regular Cournot oligopoly (with demand function (7) and exogenous S), there is a unique
Cournot equilibrium and it is in dominant strategies: x￿ = h(S)=n, so Z￿ = h(S): Hence ￿rms have
constant reactions curves, and may thus be viewed as essentially non-strategic and fully predictable
in their behavior.
The FECE solve the ￿xed-point relation Z = h(S) = S. Since f is so far an arbitrary function,
h(S) = S may have no solutions at all (if h does not intersect the 45￿ line), or as many solutions (or
FECE points) as h has ￿xed points. In particular, if h is taken to be the identity function, anything
at all is a FECE, and the model has no predictive power whatsoever!
This argument shows rather strikingly the scope of possible new outcomes that expectations
or network e⁄ects can generate, which have no counterparts in the corresponding regular Cournot
oligopoly. Indeed, this illustration has an "anything goes" ￿ avor of a rather extreme kind. This
construction also illustrates the potential for multiple equilibria in the presence of network e⁄ects,
along with new issues to face for testing such models (Echenique and Komunjer, 2009).
This construction will be invoked repeatedly below to design nice closed-form examples that
illustrate particular results.
11This is reminiscent of the question of what constitutes a valid aggregate excess demand function in general
equilibrium theory, which led to the well-known Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein theorem (Mas-Colell, Whinson and
Green, 1995). Likewise, it is also in the same vein as the issue of what constitutes a valid optimal policy in Ramsey-
type dynamic optimization models (Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986). The answers provided in these two di⁄erent
settings were similarly broad, in that any function with minimal regularity conditions is a valid outcome function.
Hence, the conclusions were that the two underlying theories impose very little structure on their respective outcome
functions.
14Figure 1: Viability and Basin of Attraction of the Trivial Equilibrium
5 Industry viability
Many studies suggest that the left panel of Figure 1 re￿ ects the structure of the telecommunica-
tion industries. The underlying game there displays three possible equilibria, the trivial equilibrium,
a middle unstable equilibrium, usually called critical mass, and a high stable equilibrium.12 The
justi￿cation of this con￿guration is quite simple: If all the consumers expect that no one will ac-
quire the good, then the good has no value and no one will end up buying it, resulting in the trivial
equilibrium for the industry. However, if expectations are higher to start with, another, non-trivial,
equilibria will prevail.
Whenever the trivial equilibrium is locally stable in expectations (as in Figure 1), one possibility
is that the market never emerges as a result of an expected size of the network that is too low to
start with. In view of the equilibrium concept adopted here, the incumbent ￿rms are simply unable
to in￿ uence these expectations to get them past the critical mass. Under such conditions, even
if the industry does get going, Cournot equilibrium on the basis of low expectations cannot lead
￿rms to produce enough output to generate expectations beyond the critical mass, and the industry
will unravel through a natural process towards the trivial equilibrium. This argument is commonly
invoked to capture the start-up problem that frequently a⁄ects these markets, and is often referred
to as the "chicken and egg" paradox. Oren and Smith (1981) o⁄er an early discussion of this
phenomenon in electronic communication markets.
12There are several de￿nitions of the notion of critical mass in the literature, some in dynamic settings and others in
static settings. In the present paper, we wish to adapt the most common de￿nition, which is as the smallest non-zero
(Cournot-) unstable FECE, to our framework taking into account the multi-valuedness of zn(S): The formal de￿nition
is given below.
15The tacit dynamic process underlying this analysis can be formalized through the following
expectations/network size recursion, starting from any initial S0 ￿ 0, where b zn will denote either
the maximal or minimal selection, but sometimes any increasing selection, of zn, as will be speci￿ed,
Sk = b zn (Sk￿1);k ￿ 1: (8)
This process thus begins with a historically given initial expectation S0, then postulates that
￿rms react by engaging in Cournot competition with demand P(Z;S0), leading to an industry
output b zn (S0). The latter will in turn determine consumers expectation S1 2 b zn (S0), and the
process repeats inde￿nitely. This yields a sequential adjustment process in which consumers and
￿rms behave myopically with respect to the size of the network. Taking a single-valued selection of
zn(S) amounts to selecting one particular Cournot equilibrium for each given S.
For each increasing selection of zn(S), denoted b zn (S), we can formally de￿ne the corresponding
critical mass as the smallest initial expectation b S0 such that for all S0 > b S0, the orbit given by (8)
converges to a nonzero FECE. This de￿nition captures the notion of critical mass irrespective of
whether the selection at hand is continuous, or continuous from one side only (i.e. right or left), or
neither, at the critical mass (see below). In the right panel of Figure 1, there is a whole interval of
critical masses, each corresponding to a di⁄erent monotonic selection of zn(S).
As we shall consider explicitly the dynamics in (8) as given by the two extremal selections, as
re￿ ected in the right side of Figure 1, the usual notions of stability need to be adapted accordingly.13
De￿nition 8 The trivial equilibrium is best-case (worst-case) stable if there is a right neighborhood
V of 0 such that for all S0 in V; the orbit Sk = zn (Sk￿1) ! 0 (Sk = zn (Sk￿1) ! 0), as k ! 1:
Here, the quali￿cation of best-case and worst-case refers to the type of Cournot equilibrium
selection given network size S. Indeed, as is intuitive, the maximal (minimal) selection is most
(least) favorable for the viability of the industry. Note that in the right panel of Figure 1, CM2 and
CM3 are the best-case and worst-case critical masses, respectively.
Let V b
n(V w
n ) denote the largest set of values of S0 for which the trivial equilibrium is best-case
(worst-case) stable. We shall refer to V b
n and V w
n as the best and worst-case basins of attraction of
the trivial equilibrium, respectively.
In view of Lemma 6, both zn and zn are continuously di⁄erentiable at 0 with z0
n (0) = z0
n (0).
Assuming henceforth that this derivative is (generically) not equal to 1, 0 is an isolated equilibrium
13Related issues are addressed in some detail in Echenique (2002).
16(for a formal proof, see e.g., Granas and Dugundji, 2003, p. 326-327). Since in addition, zn and
zn are increasing in S, both V b
n and V w
n are intervals.14 In the left panel of Figure 1, as zn (:) is
single-valued, these two intervals coincide and are equal to (0;CM1); in the right panel of this ￿gure
zn and zn induce V b
n = (0;CM2) and V w
n = (0;CM3], respectively.15
Each industry can be classi￿ed into one of three possible categories in terms of best-case or
worst￿ case viability.
De￿nition 9 An industry is said to be
(i) best-case (worst-case) uniformly viable if every orbit in (8) with b zn = zn(zn) converges to
some non-zero equilibrium starting from any S0 > 0;
(ii) best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable if, for zn(zn); the same convergence as in (i) takes
place only from su¢ ciently high S0; and
(iii) best-case (worst-case) nonviable if every orbit in (8) with b zn = zn(zn) converges to 0 from any
S0 ￿ 0.
This de￿nition extends in the obvious way to any increasing selection of zn(S), in which case
one simply removes the quali￿ers "best-case" and "worst-case".
Thus, for any increasing selection b zn (S), the critical mass is 0 if the industry is uniformly viable,
1 if it is nonviable, and satis￿es if the industry is conditionally viable:16 b S0 > 0 and
lim
S"b S0
b zn (S) ￿ b S0;b zn (S0) ￿ lim
S#b S0
b zn (S)
The next result provides su¢ cient conditions for each viability outcome by linking it to our
previous results on the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium.
Proposition 10 If A1-A5 are satis￿ed, an industry is
(i) worst-case uniformly viable if and only if either condition (i) or (ii) of Theorem 5 holds;
(ii) best-case conditionally viable if condition (iii) of Theorem 5 holds; and
14Since zn is u.h.c., zn = minzn is l.s.c. and left-continuous, and zn = maxzn is u.s.c. and right-continuous. Hence,
V
b
n is open at its upper bound while V
w
n may or may not be.
15The fact that V
b
n is open and V
w
n is right-closed follows from both Figure 1 and Footnote 14.
16In other words, there will always exist a unique critical mass for a given selection. A formal proof can easily be
given, relying only on the well-known properties of monotonic functions, in particular that all discontinuities are of
the ￿rst kind.
17(iii) best-case nonviable if the conditions of Lemma 4 and Theorem 7 hold.
To provide a basis for comparing two di⁄erent situations that might prevail for the same industry,
we need to formalize a partial order for increasing viability.
De￿nition 11 The best-case (worse-case) viability of an industry is said to increase if either
(i) the industry goes from best-case (worst-case) nonviable to best-case (worst-case) conditionally
viable, or from the latter to best-case (worst-case) uniformly viable; or
(ii) the industry is best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable and V b
n(V w
n ) contracts.
The next result shows that additional ￿rms in the market can only enhance the viability of the
network industry.17 Examples 1 and 2, at the end of this section, illustrate this key e⁄ect.
Theorem 12 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed. Then,
(i) both zn(:) and zn(:) shift up as n increases. Hence, having more ￿rms in an industry always
increases its best-case and worst-case viability; and
(ii) if the trivial outcome is an equilibrium (i.e. (3) holds) and P1 (0;0) + P2 (0;0) ￿ 0, an
industry cannot be uniformly viable for any n (even in best-case).
Theorem 12 captures the key role of market structure on industry viability: Having more ￿rms
around implies that a lower critical mass would be needed to launch a given industry. The underlying
intuition is intimately connected to the FECE concept, as discussed next. Consider the natural
question: In case S0 happens to be below critical mass, why can￿ t the existing ￿rms attempt to act
as if there were more of them by producing a higher output level in an e⁄ort to in￿ uence consumers￿
expectations of the network size upwards? In a context where the appropriate solution concept
is FECE, ￿rms presumably cannot commit to their desired output levels in a credible way, and,
likewise, attempting to in￿ ate their number by committing to a higher output would also not be
credible, and would thus not constitute behavior compatible with the FECE concept.
This result is consistent with observed market behavior. The fax market took decades beyond
the discovery of the technology to get started (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). Now and then, an attempt
17Economides and Himmelberg (1995) show that, under speci￿c conditions, the market structure has no e⁄ect on
the critical mass. Although Theorem 12 seems to contradict their ￿nding, our results do not coincide because we
de￿ne critical mass in a di⁄erent way.
18at launching a new product with network e⁄ects is seen to fail. One plausible diagnosis according to
the present analysis is an insu¢ cient number of ￿rms at the early stages of the emerging industry.
In industries with multiple ￿rms having their own versions of the same general good, this result
might explain why ￿rms often settle for full compatibility between their products, instead of in-
compatibility. Their objective is to generate a single industry network that would be viable, when
separate networks with one ￿rm each would not be. This implies that some form of cooperation
amongst direct rivals could be needed for their products to succeed. One example is the case of
Sony and Philips, who jointly created industry standards for compact disc in the mid 80￿ s (Shapiro,
1996). Such forms of cooperation have no counterparts in non-network industries.
Example 1. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs, and inverse
demand function given by
P (Z;S) = exp
￿
￿
2Z
exp(1 ￿ 1=S)
￿
with Z;S 2 [0;nK]:
The reaction function of a ￿rm is e x(y;S) = (1=2)exp(1￿1=S): Since each ￿rm has a dominant
strategy, e x(y;S) does not depend on y, and we can add the reaction functions to obtain
zn (S) = (n=2)exp(1 ￿ 1=S):
An equilibrium industry output solves zn (Z) = Z in Z. Then we have: Z1 = f0g, Z2 = f0;1g,
Z3 = f0;0:457;2:882g and Z4 = f0;0:373;4:311g, as shown in Figure 2.
As can be easily seen, the trivial equilibrium is always stable. With only one ￿rm in the market,
this is the only equilibrium so the industry is nonviable. With one extra ￿rm, a larger equilibrium
appears and the industry becomes conditionally viable (barely so as zn (:) is tangent to the 45￿ line).
For a larger number of ￿rms, the equilibrium con￿guration encompasses three equilibria; the two
extreme are stable and the intermediate one is unstable. This last equilibrium, often called critical
mass, decreases in n. This is an exact closed-form example of the three-equilibrium constellation
that is often portrayed as typical in many network industries.
Here, zn (:) shifts up as n increases (cf. Theorem 12). The industry goes from nonviable to
conditionally viable as n goes from 1 to 2 ￿rms. As n further increases, viability increases since the
basin of attraction of 0 shrinks, but uniform viability is never attained since P1(0;0)+P2(0;0) = 0
(cf. Theorem 12). ￿
In our ￿rst example, initial expectations must be high enough to start the market up (when
n ￿ 2). Although the critical mass shrinks as the number of ￿rms increases, the start-up problem
19Figure 2: Viability and Market Structure
always prevails. The next example shows an extreme case where this problem disappears when the
number of ￿rms is su¢ ciently large.
Example 2. Let us consider an alternative inverse demand function
P (Z;S) = e￿ Z
bS with Z;S 2 [0;nK] and b > 0:
The reaction function of any given ￿rm is
e x(y;S) =
8
<
:
bS if S < K=b
K if S ￿ K=b
:
Then the equilibrium correspondence of the standard Cournot with exogenous S is
zn (S) =
8
<
:
nbS if S < K=b
nK if S ￿ K=b
:
As equilibrium industry output solves zn (Z) = Z, we have three possible equilibrium con￿gurations
Zn = 0 if n < 1=b Zn 2 [0;nK] if n = 1=b Zn = f0;nKg if n > 1=b:
Figure 3 illustrates our results for b = 1=2, assuming there are 1, 2 and 3 ￿rms in the market.
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We observe in the graph that when n = 1 the slope of zn (S) with respect to S is everywhere
less than one, and the industry is nonviable. When n = 2 the industry becomes uniformly viable
(barely so, as zn (:) coincides with the 45￿ line). Finally, for all n > 2 every orbit in (8) converges
to nK starting from any S0 > 0, so the industry is uniformly viable as well. ￿
The previous examples illustrate two di⁄erent situations where the presence of network e⁄ects
might have unusual implications on ￿rms￿attitudes towards intellectual property rights and entry
deterrence. Indeed, ￿rms will not be tempted to engage in entry deterrence activities if their number
is insu¢ cient to start-up an industry. In such a case, those in possession of patents will have a much
higher incentive than usual to engage in licensing, and will even ￿nd it in their interest to give away
their patents to their competitors. Naturally, such generosity will prevail only until the industry is
started up, or until pro￿ts cease to increase with the number of competitors, as we shall see below.
6 Equilibrium price, outputs and pro￿ts
This section studies the e⁄ects of market structure on the equilibrium industry output, per-￿rm
output, market price and per-￿rm pro￿ts. Amir and Lambson (2000) address similar questions
regarding the standard Cournot competition, our results show that network e⁄ects introduce new
interesting features.
21The next analysis makes all the statements on the largest equilibrium, i.e. the one with the
largest equilibrium outputs, namely, Zn and xn. When the trivial outcome is an equilibrium, it
is also the smallest equilibrium. Since it is invariant in the number of ￿rms, the comparative
statics questions below are of no interest for that equilibrium. When the trivial outcome is not an
equilibrium, then our conclusions also apply to the minimal selections, Zn and xn.
Our ￿rst theorem relates new entry to equilibrium industry output and market price.
Theorem 13 Assume conditions A1-A5 are satis￿ed. Then, we have
(i) the extremal equilibrium industry outputs, Zn and Zn, increase in n; and
(ii) if P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) ￿ (￿)0 on In = [Zn;Zn+1], then P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ (￿)P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
:
Theorem 13 (i) is also true in standard Cournot competition, as shown by Amir and Lambson
(2000), Theorem 2.2 (b). In the latter, the usual law of demand su¢ ces for the market price to
decrease after new entry. As Part (ii) indicates, the e⁄ect of entry on market price is ambiguous
when network e⁄ects prevail. The reason is that when industry output increases the ￿rms must set
the price low enough to attract the marginal consumer, but when more buyers joint the network
consumers￿willingness to pay increases. Thus the overall e⁄ect of entry on the market price depends
on how relevant the output e⁄ect is as compared to the network e⁄ect. As a consequence, the so-
called property of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar assumptions holds in the standard
Cournot game, is not satis￿ed here.
To make inferences about the e⁄ects of entry on equilibrium per-￿rm outputs and pro￿ts, we
need to introduce a new function
g (Z) =
￿
P (Z;Z) ￿ C0 (Z=n)
￿
[P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z)] ￿ P1 (Z;Z)[P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)]: (9)
Theorem 14 In addition to A1-A5, assume Zn and Zn+1 are interior equilibria and let In =
[Zn;Zn+1]. Then, we have
(i) if g (Z) ￿ 0 on In, the largest per-￿rm equilibrium output increases in n, i.e. xn+1 ￿ xn; and
(ii) if g (Z) ￿ 0 on In, the largest per-￿rm equilibrium output decreases in n, i.e. xn+1 ￿ xn:
In short, this result holds that the scope for the business-stealing e⁄ect, which is nearly universal
in standard Cournot oligopoly (at least in a global sense), is quite a bit narrower in the presence of
network externalities. On the other hand, the scope for the opposite, or business-enhancing, e⁄ect
is much broader in the present setting, as we see next.
22Corollary 15 In addition to the conditions of Theorem 14, assume no costs of production. Then
xn+1 ￿ xn if
[P (Z;Z)P12 (Z;Z) ￿ P1 (Z;Z)P2 (Z;Z)] +
￿
P (Z;Z)P11 (Z;Z) ￿ P2
1 (Z;Z)
￿
￿ 0 (10)
on In, for which log-convexity of P (Z;S) in Z is a su¢ cient condition.
The left-hand side of (10) is the same as g (Z) when the ￿rms face no production costs. Its
￿rst term is positive by A5, and log-convexity of P (Z;S) in Z ensures the second one is positive
as well. Therefore log-convexity is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for the highest per-￿rm
equilibrium output to increase after new entry. Amir and Lambson (2000), Theorem 2.3, require
log-convexity to globally ensure the same result for standard Cournot competition. Hence network
e⁄ects facilitate this unusual outcome.
Based on Theorems 13 and 14, the following result deals with the e⁄ects of entry on per-￿rm
equilibrium pro￿ts. Recall that in standard Cournot oligopoly, the only part of the conventional
wisdom about the e⁄ects of competition that is universally valid is that per-￿rm pro￿ts decline with
the number of competitors (Amir and Lambson, 2000, and Amir, 2003). We now see that in the
presence of network e⁄ects, this result can easily be reversed.
Theorem 16 In addition to A1-A5, assume Zn and Zn+1 are interior equilibria and let In =
[Zn;Zn+1]. Then, we have
(i) if P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) ￿ 0 and g (Z) ￿ 0 on In, at the largest equilibrium, ￿n+1 ￿ ￿n; and
(ii) if P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) ￿ 0 and g (Z) ￿ 0 on In, at the largest equilibrium, ￿n+1 ￿ ￿n:
The ￿rst result provides su¢ cient conditions for the ￿rms in the market to prefer further entry
by new ￿rms. It generalizes a result in Economides (1996), based on a more speci￿c formulation,
which in turn formalizes a remark made by Katz and Shapiro (1985).
Although surprising, the intuition for this outcome is simple. New entry increases the equilibrium
industry output, as shown in Theorem 13, and a direct e⁄ect is that market price goes down by the
usual law of demand. But via the e⁄ect on the size of the network, this output increase also shifts
the inverse demand function up, thus pushing for a price increase. Then if the overall e⁄ect on the
market price is positive and each ￿rm increases own output, the existing ￿rms in the market are
better-o⁄ after new entry. As Economides (1996) states, if the externalities are strong, the network
e⁄ect dominates the usual competitive e⁄ect of entry.
23A natural question arises when pro￿ts increase in n. Why can￿ t the existing ￿rms attempt to
act as if there were more of them in order to each reap higher pro￿ts at equilibrium? Since they
would do so by producing a higher output level in an e⁄ort to in￿ uence consumers￿expectations
of the network size upward, the answer is the same as for the start-up problem: The tacit lack of
commitment power on the part of the ￿rms, which is at the heart of the FECE concept.
Corollary 17 In addition to the conditions of Theorems 14 and 16, assume P11 (Z;Z)+P12 (Z;Z) =
0, for all Z. If P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) ￿ (￿)0 on In, then, at the largest equilibrium,
(i) per-￿rm equilibrium output increases (decreases) in n, i.e. xn+1 ￿ (￿)xn; and
(ii) per-￿rm equilibrium pro￿ts increase (decrease) in n, i.e. ￿n+1 ￿ (￿)￿n.
The new condition in Corollary 17, P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z) = 0; is satis￿ed if, for example,
P (Z;S) = h(S)￿kZ with h(:) an increasing function, or P (Z;S) = f (S ￿ Z) with f (:) increasing
on the reals.
We end this section with an example that highlights the implications of Theorem 16, and then
explain how these results a⁄ect the standard characterization of the free entry number of ￿rms.
Example 3. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs, and inverse
demand function given by
P (Z;S) = maxfa + bS￿ ￿ Z;0g; with Z;S 2 [0;nK]; a ￿ 0; b > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1):
Assuming K is large enough, the reaction function of any given ￿rm is
e x(y;S) = maxf(a + bS￿ ￿ y)=2;0g:
After a simple computation, the symmetric equilibrium industry output is implicitly de￿ned by
￿Zn (1 + n) + na + nbZ￿
n = 0:
Let a = 10; b = 5 and ￿ = 4=5: Using a numerical approach, per-￿rm equilibrium pro￿ts for di⁄erent
values of n are
￿1 ￿ 14;561 < ￿2 ￿ 49;255 < ￿3 ￿ 67;316 < ￿4 ￿ 70;676
￿5 ￿ 67;288 > ￿6 ￿ 61;520 > ￿7 ￿ 55;301 > ￿8 ￿ 49;404 > ::: > ￿21 ￿ 14;444:
24We observe that when the number of ￿rms is small, n = 1;2 or 3; the incumbent ￿rms will be better
o⁄ if an extra ￿rm enters the market. When n ￿ 4, ￿rms will be worse-o⁄ after new entry:
Consider for instance a situation where entry costs are 14;440, say. Then a single ￿rm would
barely make a positive pro￿t, and potential entrants might decide to stay out if they based their
assessment on standard oligopoly settings (due to pro￿t just covering entry costs). Yet, the market
should actually accommodate a full 21 ￿rms at the unique free entry equilibrium! ￿
The next section explores some other consequences of the presence of network e⁄ects on the
well-known concept of free entry equilibrium.
7 Free entry and FECE
Consider the standard problem of free entry as a two-stage game (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston,
1986). In the ￿rst stage, each of an in￿nite number of ￿rms decides whether to enter the industry or
not, knowing the entry cost EC. In the second stage, upon observing the number of entrants, ￿rms
engage in standard Cournot competition. The free entry (subgame-perfect) equilibrium number of
￿rms ne is then de￿ned by
￿ne ￿ EC and ￿ne+1 < EC: (11)
These conditions simply state that the ne ￿rms that entered and those that did not do not re-
gret their decisions. Assuming a unique Cournot equilibrium in the second stage, the free entry
equilibrium number of ￿rms is uniquely de￿ned (ignoring the integer constraint) by the zero-pro￿t
condition ￿ne = EC since ￿n is always decreasing in n.
In the present setting with network e⁄ects, we can also de￿ne free entry equilibrium as a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, upon replacing the Cournot equilibrium in
the second stage by a FECE selection, assumed to be a non-trivial one below.18 We now investigate
the consequences of keeping the standard de￿nition of free entry equilibrium as given in (11).
In light of Theorem 16, the concept of free entry equilibrium may not be as well-behaved for
network industries.19 The equilibrium number of ￿rms ne need not be uniquely de￿ned as ￿n may
intersect the horizontal line at EC more than once, with the free entry equilibria being only those
for which this intersection is from above to below.20
18As an abuse of terminology, we ignore here the fact that FECE is not a fully game-theoretic concept.
19To begin with, FECE are often not unique, so to each FECE corresponds at least one free entry equilibrium. In
particular, the presence of the trivial equilibrium would lead to no entry always being a free entry equilibrium.
20In Example 3, it is of interest to observe that, although ￿n is inverse U-shaped in n; the free entry number of
25Figure 4: Free-entry and Network E⁄ects
To ￿x ideas, let us focus on the situation depicted in Figure 4. There are two free entry equilibria,
n1 and n3 according to the de￿nition given above. We assume in what follows that ￿n3 > EC and
￿n3+1 < EC, which holds generically (thus, in contrast to much of the literature, we are not ignoring
the integer constraint, and this will turn out to be crucial below). Clearly, with n1 ￿rms in the
market, no single ￿rm outside the market would wish to deviate and enter on its own. However, a
group of n3 ￿n1 ￿rms outside the market could stage a coalitional deviation ￿all enter the market
￿that would be bene￿cial to all coalition members. With n3 ￿rms in the market, no coalition has
a pro￿table deviation (we are assuming that, consistent with Figure 4, ￿n < EC for all n > n3).21
Hence, there is a unique strong Nash equilibrium, which is also coalition-proof, in the one-shot game
with payo⁄s written as functions of the two possible ￿rst-stage actions (enter and do not enter) for
each ￿rm, given a non-trivial FECE in the second stage. This induces what we might refer to as a
unique strong (and coalition-proof) free entry equilibrium with n3 ￿rms in. The latter is also the
Pareto-dominant free entry equilibrium if ￿n3 ￿ ￿n1, but not otherwise.22
Clearly, the underlying ideas behind this discussion are quite general. In cases where there
are multiple free entry equilibria, only one is also coalition-proof and it is always the free entry
equilibrium with the highest number of ￿rms in the market. This equilibrium clearly has a lot of
￿rms is nevertheless uniquely de￿ned for any level of EC.
21Here again, we are using the assumption ￿n3 > EC, since without it, there would be a pro￿table coalitonal
deviation to the n1 equilibrium in case ￿n1 > ￿n3.
22A general remark about the common simplifying assumption of ignoring the integer constraint in the standard
oligopoly literature is in order. If ￿ne = EC holds, then each ￿rm is indi⁄erent between entering and not entering.
So if one of the n
e ￿rms went out of the market, we would still have a free entry equilibrium, which actually Pareto-
dominates the original n
e-￿rm equilibrium since ￿ne￿1 > ￿ne. Thus ignoring the integer constraint is not as innocuous
as it seems. One way out is to assume the (rather arbitrary) tie-breaking rule that, when indi⁄erent, a ￿rm always
chooses to enter.
26intuitive appeal from an applied perspective, since the free entry number of ￿rms is often thought
of as the largest number of ￿rms that a market can sustain. It is thus reasonable to suggest
coalition-proofness as a re￿nement to the notion of free entry equilibrium in markets with network
e⁄ects.23
On the other hand, for this equilibrium to obtain, some pre-play communication without the
option of making binding agreements might well be needed, as is the case with coalition-based
equilibrium notions in general. Such coordination of entry decisions by ￿rms might well violate
existing antitrust legislation in practice.
In conclusion, the presence of network e⁄ects creates quite some novel features as far as the
central problem of free entry is concerned, and some of these might call for some new antitrust
legislation allowing for entry coordination (i.e. pre-play communication) between competitors, and
create some new scope for useful coordinating activities by other actors, such as business associa-
tions. These conclusions reinforce the earlier ￿ndings that the start-up phase of a network industry
might call for new forms of inter-￿rm cooperation.
8 Social welfare, consumer surplus and industry pro￿ts
This section studies the e⁄ects of an exogenous change in the number of ￿rms on social welfare,
consumer surplus and industry pro￿ts. As in the previous section, we continue to focus on the highest
equilibrium outputs, Zn and xn. Speci￿cally, our aim is to give su¢ cient conditions that validate, for
the highest equilibrium, the conventional wisdom that social welfare and consumer surplus increase
with more competition, while industry pro￿ts decrease. Amir (2003) answers similar questions for
standard Cournot competition, thus facilitating the corresponding comparisons.
We begin providing su¢ cient conditions for social welfare to increase with entry. Our initial
assumptions, A1-A5, are consistent with xn being increasing or decreasing in n, as re￿ ected in
Theorem 14. The next theorem shows the implications of these two possibilities on social welfare
are quite di⁄erent.
Theorem 18 At the highest equilibrium, for any given n, Wn+1 ￿ Wn if in addition to A1-A5
either one of the following conditions holds
(i)
Z Zn
0
￿
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
t;Zn
￿￿
dt ￿ Zn [A(xn+1) ￿ A(xn)]; or
23Delgado and Moreno (2004) use coalition-proofness as a re￿nement to narrow down the set of supply function
equilibria in an oligopolistic setting.
27(ii) xn+1 ￿ xn:
Note that since P2 (Z;S) > 0, by A1, and Zn+1 ￿ Zn, by Theorem 13 (i), the left hand side
of Condition (i) is always positive. So our theorem identi￿es the next two su¢ cient conditions:
Welfare increases in the number of ￿rms in the presence of diseconomies of scale (A(:) is increasing)
and decreasing per-￿rm output, or whenever per-￿rm output increases in n.
Network e⁄ects play a key role in these two conditions. As it is readily veri￿ed, they facilitate
the ￿rst inequality by enlarging the left hand side of Condition (i). As seen earlier, network e⁄ects
ease the conditions under which per-￿rm output increases in n, therefore facilitating Condition (ii).
The next result states that if marginal costs are constant, then social welfare, at the highest
equilibrium, always increases with entry. Although this outcome follows as a direct implication
of Theorem 18 (i), we include it as a separate result because it re￿ ects the case most commonly
analyzed in the existing literature.
Corollary 19 In addition to A1-A5, assume the cost of production is linear, i.e. C (x) = cx with
c ￿ 0. Then, at the highest equilibrium, social welfare always increases in the number of ￿rms.
We next study consumer surplus, for which our results di⁄er markedly from their counterparts
in the standard Cournot oligopoly.
Theorem 20 At the highest equilibrium, for any given n, CSn+1 ￿ CSn if, in addition to A1-A5,
either (i) P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
; or (ii) P12 (Z;S) ￿ 0.
As a consequence of the so-called property of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar con-
ditions holds in the standard Cournot game, Condition (i) is satis￿ed there. Example 4, at the
end of the section, shows the opposite sometimes happens in network industries. Katz and Shapiro
(1985) clearly explain why this surprising result might occur here: If the marginal consumer has a
strong network externality, then the increment in the expected network size generated by the larger
number of ￿rms in the market, will increase his willingness to pay for the product above that of
the average consumer. As a consequence, the ￿rms will be able to raise the price by more than the
increase in the average consumer￿ s willingness to pay for the product and consumer￿ s surplus will
fall.
Our last theorem deals with industry pro￿ts. Like the previous two, it provides su¢ cient con-
ditions for aggregate pro￿ts to increase after new entry.
28Theorem 21 At the highest equilibrium, for any given n, (n + 1)￿n+1 ￿ n￿n if, in addition to A1-
A5, either (i) P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
￿ A(xn+1)￿A(xn); or (ii) the conditions of Theorem
16 (i) are satis￿ed.
The proof of this result is quite simple. Relying on the fact that the highest selection of the
equilibrium industry output increases in n, it simply says that, if the overall e⁄ect on the market
price is larger than the change of the average cost of production, then industry pro￿ts increase. The
second statement follows as a simple corollary of Theorem 16 (i).
Corollary 22 In addition to A1-A5, assume the cost of production is linear, i.e. C (x) = cx with
c ￿ 0. Then, at the highest equilibrium, industry pro￿ts increase in the number of ￿rms if market
price increases after new entry.
The last result follows directly from Theorem 21 (i), as linear cost implies constant average cost.
Example 4 ends this section. It illustrates how, at the highest equilibrium industry output,
consumer surplus and industry pro￿ts might decrease and increase, respectively, after new entry.
Example 4. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs and inverse
demand function given by
P (Z;S) = maxfa ￿ Z=S3;0g where Z;S 2 [0;nK] and a;K > 1:
The reaction function of any given ￿rm is
x(y;S) =
8
<
:
max
￿￿
aS3 ￿ y
￿
=2;0
￿
if
￿
aS3 ￿ y
￿
=2 < K
K if
￿
aS3 ￿ y
￿
=2 ￿ K
:
Thus, we have three possible equilibria
Zn =
n
0;
p
(n + 1)=(na);nK
o
:
From a simple computation, consumer surplus is zero at the smallest equilibrium and, assuming a ￿
1=(nK)
2 ; it equals the following expression at the highest one
CSn = 1=(2nK)
Since this expression is decreasing in n, consumer surplus decreases after new entry for the highest
equilibrium. This result is possible because Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 20 are not satis￿ed,
i.e. the market price at the highest equilibrium increases in n and P12 (Z;S) = 3=S4 > 0 for all Z;S:
29Note that the opposite is true for aggregate pro￿ts. The following expression shows that they
increase in n at the highest equilibrium
n￿n = nK
h
a ￿ 1=(nK)
2
i
:
As Corollary 19 states, we next show that social welfare, at the highest equilibrium, increases in n
Wn = anK ￿ 1=(2nK):
These results point out some of the relevant di⁄erences between Cournot competition with and
without network e⁄ects in terms of industry performance. ￿
9 Proofs
This section provides the proofs for all the results of the paper, and also contains the statements
and proofs of some useful intermediate results not given in the body of the paper.
The proof of Lemma 1 calls for an intermediate result.
Lemma 23 Assume A1-A5 hold. Then e ￿ (Z;y;S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S):
Proof of Lemma 23
To prove this result, ￿rst note that ￿2 (Z;S) > 0 if and only if @2 logP (Z;S)=@Z@S > 0: We
show that this condition implies that e ￿ (Z;y;S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S), i.e.
that for any Z > Z0 and S > S0;
e ￿
￿
Z;y;S0￿
￿ e ￿
￿
Z0;y;S0￿
=) e ￿ (Z;y;S) > e ￿
￿
Z0;y;S
￿
: (12)
Since @2 logP (Z;S)=@Z@S > 0 we have logP (Z;S) ￿ logP (Z0;S) > logP (Z;S0) ￿ logP (Z0;S0),
or
P (Z;S)
P (Z0;S)
>
P (Z;S0)
P (Z0;S0)
: (13)
The left hand side of (12) can be rewritten as
(Z ￿ y)P
￿
Z;S0￿
￿ C (Z ￿ y) ￿
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
P
￿
Z0;S0￿
￿ C
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
: (14)
Combining (13) and (14), we get
(Z ￿ y)P (Z;S)
P (Z0;S0)
P (Z0;S)
￿ C (Z ￿ y) >
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
P
￿
Z0;S0￿
￿ C
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
: (15)
30Multiplying both sides of (15) by P (Z0;S)=P (Z0;S0) we obtain
(Z ￿ y)P (Z;S) ￿
P (Z0;S)
P (Z0;S0)
C (Z ￿ y) >
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
P
￿
Z0;S
￿
￿
P (Z0;S)
P (Z0;S0)
C
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
: (16)
By A1, P (Z0;S)=P (Z0;S0) > 1 and, by A2, C (Z ￿ y) ￿ C (Z0 ￿ y): Thus, (16) implies
(Z ￿ y)P (Z;S) ￿ C (Z ￿ y) >
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
P
￿
Z0;S
￿
￿ C
￿
Z0 ￿ y
￿
; (17)
which is just the right hand side of (12). Hence, (12) holds. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1
Since @2e ￿ (Z;y;S)=@Z@y = ￿1(Z;y) > 0, by A4, the maximand in (2) has strictly increasing
di⁄erences in (Z;y). Furthermore, the feasible correspondence (y;S) ￿! [y;y + K] is ascending
in y: Then, by Topkis￿ s theorem [Theorem A.1, Appendix], every selection from the argmax of
e ￿ (Z;y;S), e Z (y;S), increases in y:
By Lemma 23, e ￿ (Z;y;S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S). In addition, the
feasible correspondence (y;S) ￿! [y;y + K] does not depend on S. Then, by [Theorem A.2,
Appendix] due to Milgrom and Shannon (1994), every selection from the argmax of e ￿ (Z;y;S),
e Z (y;S), is also increasing in S: ￿
Proof of Theorem 2
The following mapping, which can be thought of as a normalized cumulative best-response, is
the key element in dealing with symmetric equilibria for any n24
Bn : [0;(n ￿ 1)K] ￿ [0;nK] ￿! 2[0;(n￿1)K]￿[0;nK]
(y;S) ￿!
￿
n ￿ 1
n
￿
x0 + y
￿
;x0 + y
￿
where x0 denotes a best-response output level by a ￿rm to a joint output y by the other (n￿1) ￿rms,
given S. It is readily veri￿ed that the (set-valued) range of Bn is as given, i.e. if x0 2 [0;K] and
y 2 [0;(n ￿ 1)K], then ((n ￿ 1)=n)(x0 + y) 2 [0;(n ￿ 1)K] and x0 + y 2 [0;nK]: Also, a ￿xed point
of Bn is easily seen as a symmetric equilibrium, for it must satisfy both b y = ((n ￿ 1)=n)(b x0 + b y);
or b x0 = b y=(n ￿ 1); and b S = b x0 + b y; which says that the responding ￿rm produces as much as each
of the other (n ￿ 1) ￿rms and the expected size of the network is ful￿lled at equilibrium.
By Lemma 1 we know that every selection of e Z (y;S) increases in y and S: Hence, for any
￿xed n 2 N, every selection of Bn increases in (y;S), so that by Tarski￿ s ￿xed point theorem
24See Amir and Lambson (2000) and Kwon (2007).
31[Theorem A.3, Appendix], it has a ￿xed point. As argued before, a ￿xed point of Bn is a symmetric
equilibrium. This proves the ￿rst statement of Theorem 2. We next show that no asymmetric
equilibria exists.
To this end, it su¢ ces to show that the correspondence e Z (y;S) is strictly increasing (in the
sense that all its selections are strictly increasing) in y, for each S. Thus, for all possible S, to each
Z0 2 e Z (y;S) corresponds (at most) one y such that Z0 = x0 + y with Z0 being a best-response to
y and S. In other words, for each equilibrium output Z0, each ￿rm must be producing the same
x0 = Z0 ￿ y, with y = (n ￿ 1)x0.
A4 implies that @e ￿ (Z;y;S)=@Z is strictly increasing in y, a property slightly stronger than
strictly increasing di⁄erences in (Z;y): By Topkis (1998), Theorem 2.8.5 on p. 79, this property
implies that e Z (y;S) is strictly increasing in y for each S, whenever e Z (y;S) is interior.25 The
second statement in Theorem 2 follows because, as argued in the previous paragraph, this condition
guarantees no asymmetric equilibria exist. ￿
The next proof, from Amir and Lambson (2000), is included for completeness only.
Proof of Lemma 3
To show Part (i) consider the mapping
Tn : [0;(n ￿ 1)K] ￿! 2[0;(n￿1)K]
y ￿!
￿
n ￿ 1
n
￿
x0 + y
￿￿
: (18)
The proof of existence and the fact that no asymmetric equilibrium exists follow as a simply corollary
of the proof of Theorem 2, thus we omit it.
We next show that if A5 is also satis￿ed, the extremal selections of zn (S), zn (S) and zn (S),
increase in S. We know, by Topkis￿ s theorem, that the maximal and minimal selections of Tn
denoted, respectively, Tn and Tn; exist. Furthermore, the largest value of zn (S), zn (S), constitutes
the largest ￿xed point of Tn. Under A5 we know, by Lemma 1, that every selection of e Z (y;S)
increases in S. Then the largest ￿xed point of Tn, zn (S); is also increasing in S [Theorem A.4,
Appendix]. A similar argument, using the selection Tn, establishes that zn (S) is increasing in S.
This ends the proof of Part (ii).
To prove Part (iii), we show that adding A6 leads to zn (:) being a single-valued and continuous
function. From Amir (1996a), Theorem 2.1, we know that the best-response correspondence e x(y;S),
25This result was proved in Amir (1996) and Edlin and Shannon (1998).
32as de￿ned in (1), is nonincreasing given that P(Z;S) is log-concave in Z. In addition, since every
selection of e Z (y;S) increases in y (Lemma 1) and e Z (y;S) = e x(y;S) + y, it follows that every
selection of e x(y;S) has all its slopes bounded below by ￿1. Altogether then, all the slopes of every
selection of e x(y;S) lie in [￿1;0]. This leads to the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium through a
well-known argument, a proof of which is given in Amir and Lambson (2000), Theorem 2.3. Hence,
zn (:) is single-valued. Since zn (:) is also u.h.c. as a correspondence, due to ￿rms￿payo⁄s being
continuous in S, the conclusion follows. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4
By de￿nition, an industry output of 0 is a FECE if 0 2 e x(0;0). This holds if and only if we
have
￿ (0;0;0) ￿ ￿ (x;0;0)
0 ￿ xP (x;0) ￿ C (x)
C (x) ￿ xP (x;0)
for all x 2 [0;K]: This proves our ￿rst statement. The second one follows because all the steps are
independent of the number of ￿rms in the market. ￿
The proof of Theorem 5 calls for several intermediate results, which will turn out to be useful for
some other proofs as well. We ￿rst state su¢ cient conditions under which an increasing selection
of zn (S) is di⁄erentiable for almost all S, and give a speci￿c functional form for its slope. We then
show that when 0 is part of the equilibrium set, then zn (0) is single-valued and right-continuous.
Lemma 24 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed. Let b zn be an increasing selection of zn (S), such that
b zn (S) 2 (0;nK). Then b zn (S) is di⁄erentiable for almost all S; and its slope is given by
@b zn (S)
@S
=
￿nfP1(b zn;S)P2(b zn;S) ￿ [P(b zn;S) ￿ C0 (b zn=n)]P12(b zn;S)g
(n + 1)[P1(b zn;S)]
2 ￿ n[P(b zn;S) ￿ C0 (b zn=n)]P11(b zn;S) ￿ P1(b zn;S)C00 (b zn=n)
(19)
where b zn stands for b zn (S):
Proof of Lemma 24
If b zn (S) is interior, it must satisfy the ￿rst order condition
P(b zn;S) + (b zn=n)P1(b zn;S) ￿ C0 (b zn=n) = 0 (20)
33where b zn stands for b zn (S). Multiplying both sides of (20) by n
nP(b zn;S) + znP1(b zn;S) ￿ nC0 (b zn=n) = 0: (21)
Since b zn (S) is increasing, it is di⁄erentiable almost everywhere (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure) and
@b zn (S)
@S
=
￿[nP2(b zn;S) + e znP12(b zn;S)]
(n + 1)P1(b zn;S) + b znP11(b zn;S) ￿ C00 (b zn=n)
: (22)
Substituting b zn (S) by its implicit value in (20), and multiplying the numerator and the denominator
by P1(zn;S), we obtain (19). ￿
Proof of Lemma 6
We ￿rst show that if 0 2 zn (0), then 0 = zn (0), i.e., zn (0) is a singleton. By Lemma 4 we know
that 0 2 zn (0) if and only if
xP (x;0) ￿ C (x) for all x 2 [0;K]: (23)
Since P1 (Z;S) < 0 by A1, it follows from (23) that xP (x + y;0) < C (x) for all x 2 (0;K] and all
y > 0: Hence, 0 is a dominant strategy in the standard Cournot game given S = 0. This proves
that zn (0) is single-valued.
The fact that P (0;0) = C0(0) ensures the trivial outcome is an interior equilibrium. To show
(5), take any sequence Sk # 0 such that b zn is di⁄erentiable at Sk for all k (this is possible since the
set of points of di⁄erentiability of an increasing function forms a dense subset of its domain). Since
b zn is increasing, it has left and right limits at every point, so the limit limk!1 b zn(Sk) exists. Since
zn(:) is u.h.c. (see the proof of Lemma 3), limk!1 b zn(Sk) 2 zn (0) = f0g, so that by the earlier part
of this proof, limk!1 b zn(Sk) = 0.
Now consider (22) with S = Sk. By Assumption A1 and the fact that limk!1 b zn(Sk) = 0, the
right-hand side of (22) is right-continuous in S at 0. Taking limits as k ￿! 1, (5) follows. Since
this argument is clearly independent of the particular (increasing) selection b zn and of the sequence
(Sk) chosen, @zn (S)=@SjS=0 is single-valued, continuous at 0, and given by (5).
The fact that z0
n (0) = 0 if the trivial equilibrium in not interior follows directly from our previous
arguments, thus we omit this proof. ￿
We next show that, for all S 2 [0;nK], any argmax of a ￿ctitious objective function ￿(Z;S)
is an element of zn (S): Note that, given S, ￿(Z;S) may be viewed as a weighted combination of
industry pro￿ts and welfare, with respective weights 1
n and n￿1
n , as constructed by Bergstrom and
Varian (1985) for standard Cournot.
34Lemma 25 Assume A1-A5 are satis￿ed and C (:) is convex. De￿ne
￿(Z;S) ,
n ￿ 1
n
Z Z
0
P (t;S)dt +
Z
n
P (Z;S) ￿ nC (Z=n):
Given any n 2 N and S 2 [0;nK], if Z0 2 argmaxf￿(Z;S) : 0 ￿ Z ￿ nKg then Z0 2 zn (S):
Proof of Lemma 25
Assume Z￿ is an argmax of ￿(Z;S), we need to show Z￿ corresponds to the industry output
of a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with exogenous S. Let Z￿ = x￿ + y￿, with x￿ = Z￿=n and
y￿ = (n ￿ 1)x￿, and consider Z0 = x0 + y￿, with x0 2 [0;K]: Then x0 denotes a possible deviation
of a given ￿rm from its equilibrium output x￿: We next show this unilateral deviation is never
pro￿table.
Since Z￿ is a maximizer of ￿(Z;S); then ￿(Z￿;S) ￿ ￿(Z0;S), which is equivalent to say
n ￿ 1
n
Z x￿+y￿
0
P (t;S)dt + x￿P (x￿ + y￿;S) ￿ nC (x￿) ￿
(n ￿ 1)
n
Z x0+y￿
0
P (t;S)dt +
(x0 + y￿)
n
P
￿
x0 + y￿;S
￿
￿ nC
￿
x0 + y￿
n
￿
(24)
Then we have
x￿P (x￿ + y￿;S) ￿ C (x￿)
￿
n ￿ 1
n
Z x0+y￿
0
P (t;S)dt +
(x0 + y￿)
n
P
￿
x0 + y￿;S
￿
￿ nC
￿
x0 + y￿
n
￿
￿
n ￿ 1
n
Z x￿+y￿
0
P (t;S)dt + (n ￿ 1)C (x￿)
￿
n ￿ 1
n
Z x0+y￿
x￿+y￿
P (t;S)dt +
(x0 + y￿)
n
P
￿
x0 + y￿;S
￿
￿ C
￿
x0￿
￿
(n ￿ 1)(x0 ￿ x￿)
n
P
￿
x0 + y￿;S
￿
+
(x0 + y￿)
n
P
￿
x0 + y￿;S
￿
￿ C
￿
x0￿
= x0P
￿
x0 + y￿;S
￿
￿ C
￿
x0￿
:
The ￿rst inequality follows from (24), after rearranging terms. The second one holds as we assumed
C (:) is convex (and y￿ = (n ￿ 1)x￿), and the last one by A1, P1 (Z;S) < 0: Since x0 is arbitrary,
this argument shows that x￿ is a symmetric Cournot equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Theorem 5
Part (i) holds because, if the trivial outcome (zero output) is not part of the equilibrium set,
Theorem 2 guarantees there is a FECE with strictly positive industry output.
35Parts (ii) and (iii) are both based on the following argument. By Lemma 3, the maximal and
minimal selections of zn (S), zn (S) and zn (S), increase in S. Assume, for the moment, there exists
an S0 2 (0;nK] such that zn (S0) ￿ S0: If we restrict attention to the values of S in [S0;nK],
it follows that zn (S) 2 [S0;nK] because zn (:) is increasing and zn (S0) ￿ S0: Therefore, for all
S 2 [S0;nK], zn (S) is an increasing function that maps [S0;nK] into itself. Hence, by Tarski￿ s ￿xed
point theorem [Theorem A.3, Appendix], there is an S0 ￿ S00 ￿ nK such that zn (S00) = S00: Since
this condition implies zn (S00) is a strictly positive FECE, the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium
reduces to showing there is at least one S 2 (0;nK] for which an element of zn (S) is above S, i.e.
zn (S) ￿ S:
To prove Part (ii), we show z0
n (0) > 1. Using Lemma 6, z0
n (0) > 1 if, given P1 (0;0)+P2 (0;0) >
0,
n >
￿
￿P1 (0;0) + C00 (0)
￿
=[P1 (0;0) + P2 (0;0)]:
Then the existence of a nontrivial FECE follows by the argument in the previous paragraph, as
Lemma 6 and the property z0
n (0) > 1; imply there exists a small " > 0 for which zn (") > ": This
completes the proof of Part (ii).
Condition (4) in Part (iii) is equivalent to say there is some S 2 (0;nK] and some b Z ￿ S for
which n
h
￿
￿
b Z;S
￿
￿ ￿(Z;S)
i
￿ 0 for all Z ￿ S: As a consequence, the largest argmax of ￿(Z;S)
must be larger than S. Call this argmax Z0. Our proof follows because Z0 2 zn (S), by Lemma 25,
and this ensures there is an S 2 (0;nK] for which an element of zn (S) is higher than S: ￿
Proof of Theorem 7
Under A1-A6 we know, by Lemma 3, that zn (:) is a single-valued, continuous and increasing
function. The fact that f (Z;n) is equal to its slope along the diagonal, follows from a stronger
version of Lemma 24 as follows. Consider (20) with zn (S) instead of b zn (S). By the implicit
function theorem, @zn (S)=@S exists at every S and is given by (19) with b zn (S) replaced by zn (S).
Evaluating this along the diagonal Z = S, we see that it is equal to f (Z;n).
The uniqueness result now follows directly from the assumption f (Z;n) < 1 for all Z; since any
two adjacent ￿xed points of zn (S) must include one for which f (Z;n) ￿ 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 10
By Lemma 3, zn (:) and zn (:) are increasing.
To prove Part (i), ￿rst assume 0 is not an equilibrium. Then zn (0) > 0 and the orbit in (8) with
b zn = zn and S0 = 0 (or S0 near 0) must converge to the smallest ￿xed point of zn (:), which is a
36strictly positive equilibrium by (the successive approximation part of) Tarski￿ s ￿xed point theorem.
Hence orbits with higher values of S0 will converge to non-zero ￿xed points of zn (:):
Next, assume Condition (ii) of Theorem 5 holds. Then we know that zn (S) > S for S small
enough (cf. Lemma 6). So any orbit with S0 near 0 converges to the smallest ￿xed point of zn (:)
with strictly positive output, and orbits with higher values of S0 are as in the previous step.
To prove Part (ii), Condition (iii) of Theorem 5 ensures there is an S0 2 (0;nK] for which
zn (S0) ￿ S0. By Tarski￿ s Theorem applied to zn mapping [S0,nK] to itself, the orbit starting at
S0 must converge to a strictly positive equilibrium.
To prove Part (iii), note that since 0 is a FECE, there can be no other FECE by Theorem 7.
Hence, every orbit from any S0 is a decreasing sequence to 0. ￿
Proof of Theorem 12
To prove Part (i), we use the mapping (18) in the proof of Lemma 3. We know, by Topkis￿ s
theorem, that the maximal and minimal selections of Tn, Tn and Tn; exist. Furthermore, the
largest value of zn (S), zn (S), constitutes the largest ￿xed point of Tn. Since (n ￿ 1)=n increases
in n every selection of Tn is increasing. Then the largest ￿xed point of Tn, zn (S); is also increasing
in n [Theorem A.4, Appendix]. A similar argument, using the selection Tn, establishes that zn (S)
is increasing in n.
The second statement of Part (i) follows directly from De￿nition 11 and the fact that zn (S)
and zn (S) shift up as n increases.
To prove Part (ii), observe that if the trivial equilibrium holds and P1 (0;0)+P2 (0;0) ￿ 0, then,
by Lemma 6, z0
n (0) < 1 8 n, so that 0 is a stable equilibrium 8 n. This ends our proof. ￿
Proof of Theorem 13
The maximal and minimal selections of Bn (as de￿ned in the proof of Theorem 2) denoted,
respectively, Bn and Bn; exist by Topkis￿ s theorem. Furthermore, the largest equilibrium values of
yn and Zn ,
￿
yn;Zn
￿
, constitute the largest ￿xed point of Bn. Since (n ￿ 1)=n is increasing in n,
Bn is increasing in n for all (y;S). Since Bn is also increasing in both y and S, the largest ￿xed
point of Bn;
￿
yn;Zn
￿
; is also increasing in n (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). A similar argument,
using the selection Bn; establishes that
￿
y
n;Zn
￿
increases in n as well. This shows part (i).
Part (ii) follows directly from Part (i) since dP (Z;Z)=dz = P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z): ￿
Proof of Theorem 14
37Consider the following mapping
Mn : [0;nK] ￿! 2[0;K]
Z ￿! e x =
￿
x : P (Z;Z) + xP1 (Z;Z) ￿ C0 (x) = 0
￿
: (25)
Then Mn maps industry output into the solution of a ￿ctitious ￿rst order condition, which coincides
with that of an interior FECE when x = Z=n and Z = Zn:
Totally di⁄erentiating this ￿rst order condition with respect to n; we have
fP1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) + e x[P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z)]g
dz
dn
= 0: (26)
Substituting in (26) e x by [C0 (Z=n) ￿ P (Z;Z)]=P1 (Z;Z); and rearranging terms, we get
￿
1
P1 (Z;Z)
￿￿
P (Z;Z) ￿ C0 (Z=n)
￿
[P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z)] ￿ P1 (Z;Z)[P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)]
￿ dz
dn
= 0:
(27)
Substituting g (Z) from (9) into (27), we get
￿
1
P1 (Z;Z)
g (Z)
dz
dn
= 0: (28)
By A1, P1 (Z;Z) < 0. Also, by Theorem 13 (i), the extremal equilibrium industry outputs increase
in n: Then, if g (Z) ￿ (￿)0 over
￿
Zn;Zn+1
￿
, the mapping Mn increases (decreases) in n at the
largest equilibrium industry output. Theorem 14 follows because if Mn increases (decreases) in n
at the largest equilibrium industry output, then xn also increases (decreases) with this parameter.
By a similar argument it can be shown that this is also true for xn. ￿
Proof of Corollary 15
Inequality 10 equals function g (Z) when the ￿rms face no cost of production. Then the ￿rst
claim follows directly from Theorem 14 (i).
The ￿rst term in the left hand side of (10) is always positive by A5. As the log-convexity
of P (Z;S) in Z guarantees the second term is also positive, this is a su¢ cient condition for the
required inequality. ￿
Proof of Theorem 16
38Consider the following inequalities
￿n+1 = xn+1P
￿
xn+1 + yn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ C (xn+1)
￿ xnP
￿
xn + yn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ C (xn)
￿ xnP
￿
xn+1 + yn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ C (xn)
￿ xnP
￿
xn + yn;Zn
￿
￿ C (xn)
= ￿n:
The ￿rst inequality follows by the Cournot equilibrium property. The second one is from xn+1 ￿ xn
and A1. (The fact that xn+1 ￿ xn here follows by Theorem 14 (i) because we assumed all its
required conditions are satis￿ed.) The third inequality follows because our assumptions imply
P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
: Therefore, ￿n+1 ￿ ￿n: By a similar argument it can be shown that
this is also true for the equilibrium per-￿rm pro￿ts evaluated at the minimal equilibrium outputs.
This shows Part (i).
We omit the proof of Part (ii) as it is almost identical to the previous one. ￿
Proof of Corollary 17
If P11 (Z;Z)+P12 (Z;Z) = 0, then g (Z) = ￿P1 (Z;Z)[P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)]: By A1, P1 (Z;Z) <
0. Then the sign of g (Z) is equal to the sign of P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z), and Corollary 17 (i) and (ii)
follow by Theorems 14 (i) and 16 (i), respectively. ￿
Proof of Theorem 18
To show Part (i) consider
Wn+1 ￿ Wn =
Z Zn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt ￿ Zn+1A(xn+1) ￿
"Z Zn
0
P
￿
t;Zn
￿
dt ￿ ZnA(xn)
#
￿
Z Zn
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt ￿ ZnA(xn+1) ￿
"Z Zn
0
P
￿
t;Zn
￿
dt ￿ ZnA(xn)
#
￿ 0:
The ￿rst inequality follows because P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
￿A(xn+1) ￿ 0 for all t ￿ Zn+1, and Zn+1 ￿ Zn by
Theorem 13 (i). The second inequality holds by the assumed conditions.
To show Part (ii) let us de￿ne Vn (x;S) =
R nx
0 P (t;S)dt￿nC (x): Notice Vn (x;S) is concave in
39x since n[nP1 (nx;S) ￿ C00 (x)] < 0 by both A1 and A4. In addition,
Z Zn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt =
Z nxn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt +
Z Zn+1
nxn+1
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt
￿
Z nxn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt + xn+1P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
(29)
where the inequality follows by A1. The following steps show our result
Wn+1 ￿ Wn =
Z (n+1)xn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt ￿ (n + 1)C (xn+1) ￿
￿Z nxn
0
P
￿
t;Zn
￿
dt ￿ nC (xn)
￿
￿ ￿n+1 +
Z nxn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt ￿ nC (xn+1) ￿
￿Z nxn
0
P
￿
t;Zn
￿
dt ￿ nC (xn)
￿
￿ ￿n+1 +
Z nxn+1
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt ￿ nC (xn+1) ￿
￿Z nxn
0
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
dt ￿ nC (xn)
￿
= ￿n+1 + Vn
￿
xn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ Vn
￿
xn;Zn+1
￿
￿ ￿n+1 +
￿
@Vn
￿
xn+1;Zn+1
￿
=@x
￿
(xn+1 ￿ xn)
= ￿n+1 + n
￿
P
￿
nxn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ C0 (xn+1)
￿
(xn+1 ￿ xn)
￿ ￿n+1 + n
￿
P
￿
(n + 1)xn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ C0 (xn+1)
￿
(xn+1 ￿ xn)
￿ 0:
The ￿rst inequality follows from inequality (29), the second one by A1 and Theorem 13 (i) and
the third one by the concavity of Vn (x;S) in x: The fourth inequality holds by A1 and because we
assumed xn+1 ￿ xn, and the last one by the Cournot property. This completes our proof. ￿
Proof of Corollary 19
If the cost of production is linear, the right hand side of the required condition in Theorem 18
(i) is zero. Its left hand side is always positive because Zn+1 ￿ Zn and, by A1, P2 (Z;S) > 0. Our
result follows because these two facts ensure Theorem 18 (i) is satis￿ed. ￿
Proof of Theorem 20
The proof of Part (i) follows directly from Theorem 13 (i).
40The following steps prove Part (ii)
CSn+1 ￿ CSn =
Z Zn+1
0
￿
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿￿
dt ￿
Z Zn
0
￿
P
￿
t;Zn
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿￿
dt
￿
Z Zn
0
￿
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿￿
dt ￿
Z Zn
0
￿
P
￿
t;Zn
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿￿
dt
= Zn
￿
P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn+1;Zn
￿￿
￿
Z Zn
0
￿￿
P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn+1;Zn
￿￿
￿
￿
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
t;Zn
￿￿￿
dt
￿ Zn
￿
P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn+1;Zn
￿￿
￿ 0:
The ￿rst inequality follows directly from P1 (Z;S) < 0 and Theorem 13 (i). The next step is
obtained from the previous one by adding and subtracting
R Zn
0 P
￿
Zn+1;Zn
￿
dt; and rearranging
terms: To justify the second inequality notice that P12 (Z;S) ￿ 0 is su¢ cient for
Z Zn
0
￿
P
￿
t;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
t;Zn
￿￿
dt ￿
Z Zn
0
￿
P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn+1;Zn
￿￿
dt:
Our last step is true since P1 (Z;S) < 0.
Hence, P12 (Z;S) ￿ 0 8 Z;S 2 [0;nK] is su¢ cient for CSn+1 ￿ CSn ￿ 0; or CSn+1 ￿ CSn: ￿
Proof of Theorem 21
For an extremal equilibrium industry output, consider
(n + 1)￿n+1 ￿ n￿n = Zn+1
￿
P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ A(xn+1)
￿
￿ Zn
￿
P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
￿ A(xn)
￿
￿ Zn
￿
P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ A(xn+1)
￿
￿ Zn
￿
P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
￿ A(xn)
￿
= Zn
￿
[P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ P
￿
Zn;Zn
￿
] ￿ [A(xn+1) ￿ A(xn)]
￿
:
Since P
￿
Zn+1;Zn+1
￿
￿ A(xn+1) ￿ 0, the inequality follows by Theorem 13 (i). The ￿rst part of
Theorem 21 simply says that if the last function is positive, then (n + 1)￿n+1 ￿ n￿n: This shows
Part (i). Part (ii) follows directly from Theorem (16) (i) so we omit it. ￿
Proof of Corollary 22
This result follows directly from Theorem 21 (i), because linear cost implies constant average
cost of production. ￿
41APPENDIX
In an attempt to make this paper self-contained, we provide a summary of all lattice-theoretic
notions and results used here. Since this paper deals with real decision and parameter spaces, every
theorem that follows is a special case of the original one (see Topkis, 1998).
A function F: R2
+ ! R is supermodular if, for x1 ￿ x2; y1 ￿ y2,
F (x1;y1)￿F (x2;y1)￿ F (x1;y2)￿F (x2;y2): (30)
If F is twice continuously di⁄erentiable, Topkis￿ s (1978) Characterization Theorem says that su-
permodularity is equivalent to
@2F
@x@y
￿ 0; for all x, y. Furthermore,
@2F
@x@y
> 0 implies that F is
strictly supermodular, the latter notion being de￿ned by a strictly inequality in (30). Supermodu-
larity is usually interpreted as a complementarity property: Having more of one variable increases
the marginal returns to having more of the other variable.
F has the single-crossing property or SCP in (x;y) if, for x1 ￿ x2; y1 ￿ y2,
F (x1;y1)￿F (x2;y2)￿ 0 =) F (x1;y2)￿F (x2;y1)￿ 0 (31)
Note that (30) implies (31), while the converse is generally not true. Additionally, (30) is a cardinal
notion while (31) is ordinal. Thus, the SCP is sometimes also referred to as ordinal supermodularity.
For x 2 R+, let A(x) = [a1 (x);a2 (x)] ￿ R+, with a1 (:) and a2 (:) being real-valued func-
tions. A(:) is ascending (in x) if a1 and a2 are increasing in x: The following results on monotone
maximizers are central to our approach.
Theorem A.1. (Topkis (1978)). Assume that (i) F is upper-semi continuous (or u.s.c.) and
supermodular in (x;y) and (ii) A(:) is ascending. Then, the maximal and minimal selections of
y￿ (x) ￿ argmaxy2A(x) F (x;y) are increasing functions. Furthermore, if F is strictly supermodular,
then every selection of y￿ (:) is increasing.
Theorem A.2. (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)). Assume that (i) F is u.s.c. and has the SCP
in (x;y) and (ii) A(:) is ascending. Then, the conclusion of Theorem A.1. holds.
The theorem that follows is a special case of Tarski￿ s Fixed Point Theorem.
Theorem A.3. Let n ￿ 1 and B : Xn
i=1[ai;bi] ! Xn
i=1[ai;bi] be an increasing function. Then
B has a ￿xed point.
Our equilibrium comparisons are based on the following result (Milgrom and Roberts,1990).
42Theorem A.4. Let Bt : Xn
i=1[ai;bi] ! Xn
i=1[ai;bi] be an increasing function, 8t, such that
Bt (x) is also increasing in t, 8x. Then the minimal and maximal ￿xed-points of Bt are increasing
in t.
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